Miranda v. Arizona

The Court held, 6–3, that an officer's failure to read Miranda warnings to a suspect in custody does not alone provide basis for a claim of civil liability under Section 1983 of United States Code.

The Court ruled that interrogating a prisoner was not custodial per se under Miranda, and in this case's circumstances it was not custodial, so it reversed the Sixth Circuit and denied the prisoner's habeas petition.· AI-written

The Supreme Court of the United States held that age and mental status are relevant when determining police custody for Miranda purposes, overturning its prior ruling from seven years before.

The Court held that, unless and until a criminal suspect explicitly states that they are relying on their right to remain silent, their voluntary statements may be used in court and police may continue to question them.

The Court held that police may re-open questioning of a suspect who has asked for counsel (thereby under Edwards v. Arizona ending questioning) if there has been a 14-day or more break in Miranda custody.

The Supreme Court of the United States ruled on the language requirements for Miranda warnings.

The Court struck down the police practice of first obtaining an inadmissible confession without giving Miranda warnings, then issuing the warnings, and then obtaining a second confession.

In a case over whether a 17-year-old questioned for two hours without Miranda warnings was in custody, the Court declined to overturn the state court's conclusion that he was not, because it was not objectively incorrect.· AI-written

The Court upheld the requirement that the Miranda warning be read to criminal suspects and struck down a federal statute that purported to overrule Miranda v. Arizona (1966).

The Court established that a suspect can legally assert the right to counsel during questioning only through an "unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel."· AI-written

The Court considered whether an officer's undisclosed opinion that a questioned person was a suspect mattered for Miranda custody, and held unanimously that such a subjective view was irrelevant, reversing and remanding.· AI-written

The Court held that, of several incriminating statements a drunk-driving suspect made in police custody, only his confused answer about when he turned six was inadmissible, as it was testimonial; the others were admissible.· AI-written

The Court held that undercover police agents did not need to give Miranda warnings when talking to suspects in jail.

The Court clarified and extended the protections provided under Edwards v. Arizona.

The Court ruled that a person in police custody following a misdemeanor traffic offense was entitled to the protections of the Fifth Amendment pursuant to the decision in Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

The Court held that once a defendant invokes his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, police must cease custodial interrogation.

The Court, clarifying what counts as interrogation under Miranda, held that interrogation includes not just direct questioning but also its functional equivalent, meaning police words or actions reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.· AI-written

The Court determined that it is not necessary to provide full Miranda warnings to a person called to testify before a grand jury; and that false statements given during that testimony may not be suppressed in a subsequent prosecution for perjury.

The Court held that a criminal suspect's assertion of his right to remain silent after a Miranda warning does not preclude the police from re-Mirandizing him and questioning him about a different crime.

The Court held that if a state law defines a crime more broadly than the common understanding of that crime, a conviction under that state law cannot be used as a sentencing enhancement under the federal Armed Career Criminal Act.